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THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW SYSTEM: NEW ACTORS,
NEW INSTITUTIONS, NEW SOURCES
GRAEME B. DINWOODIE*
It is now ten years since the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) was concluded, subsuming that
seemingly comprehensive intellectual property treaty into the
institutional apparatus of the World Trade Organization (WTO). For
many observers, TRIPs and the WTO established the framework of a
new international intellectual property system. They were the center of
the new system, into which other institutional components would feed,
and from which other institutions would draw their agenda. The norms
that TRIPs and the WTO articulated would inform all aspects of
international intellectual property lawmaking. Indeed, around that
time, a group of scholars published a collection of essays under the title
GATT or WIPO?, contemplating the extent to which the WTO would
displace the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) as the
dominant institution of international intellectual property law.
Ten years on, the answer to that question is neither the WTO, nor
WIPO. It is the WTO
and WIPO;
and the practices of multinational information industry actors;
and technology that operates without regard to territory;
and national courts developing for the first time a private
international law of intellectual property;
and new actors whose authority and remit are not linked to any
particular nation-state;
and transnational networks of nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs);
and existing international institutions that now find their work
impacted by intellectual property law.
* Professor of Law, Associate Dean, and Director of the Program in Intellectual Property
Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law; Professor of Intellectual Property Law, Queen Mary
College, University of London. This Lecture is a revised version of a lecture that was
previously published in 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 213 (2004). It was also presented at the
“The First Ten Years of the TRIPs Agreement” conference at Marquette University Law
School in April 2005.
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The international intellectual property system has become a network
of numerous institutions with many new actors, establishing and
operating under new structures, and generating a welter of new norms.
This is a much less convenient, much messier picture than the narrative
of TRIPs as the central framework. But it is a fuller picture of the
system by which intellectual property norms are generated and
implemented internationally.
There is a danger that the elevation of TRIPs to the focal point of
the system might create a myopia, distracting scholars and policymakers
from attending fully to institutions and actors that are contributing to
the internationalization of intellectual property law with as much (if not
more) effect than TRIPs and the WTO. The internationalization of law
comes about through many devices other than international law. It is
therefore important that we adopt a broader vision of the international
intellectual property system.
Of course, TRIPs has been and remains a vital component of the
new international intellectual property system. Its adoption generated
institutional competition with WIPO and gave birth to a useful range of
alternative lawmaking devices. The enhanced protection that TRIPs
ensured on a broader geographic scale raised the visibility of intellectual
property rights and drew a broader range of actors into the public
debate and the lawmaking process.
But TRIPs is only one component. In the first part of this lecture, I
will highlight a few of the system’s new institutions and lawmaking
dynamics. Then I will suggest how we might reorient debates about the
international intellectual property system in ways that allow us to strike
a balance that many commentators feel is now lacking.
To begin with, however, in assessing the system, it is important to
note that international intellectual property policymakers are engaged
in an attempt simultaneously to strike two different balances. One
balance, which likewise drives domestic intellectual property law, is that
between private rights sufficient to incentivize creative behavior and
third-party access to the fruits of that creativity so as to maximize its
social value. But the incentives likely to maximize the production and
dissemination of knowledge may vary from country to country, and thus
international intellectual property law must attend to a second balance,
one that occupies the attention of international law generally, and that is
the balance between universal norms and the national autonomy
necessary to legislate a substantive balance appropriate to each nationstate.
With that metric in mind, let me briefly provide some examples of
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the new institutions I mentioned.
1) The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP)
adopted by the Internet Corportation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (ICANN) in 1999 is perhaps the most notable example of
private ordering that has mitigated the jurisdictional difficulties
presented by the ubiquity of the Internet. The UDRP has become the
international standard for resolving cybersquatting disputes.
Although ICANN’s authority derives from an agreement with the
U.S. Department of Commerce, it operates largely without reference to
the laws of any particular nation. The UDRP shows that private actors,
and actors that cannot be described using the traditional labels of
“national,” “international” or “supranational,” may create
“international intellectual property law” with virtually as much ease
(and certainly as much effect) as nation-states.
Results in UDRP proceedings can, however, be overcome by
contrary determinations in national courts. The UDRP is soft law. Yet
in practice, “appeals” to national courts have rarely been invoked, and
thus the UDRP has proven to be much harder law than theory would
suggest.
2) The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998 (DMCA) immunizes
an Internet service provider (ISP) from damages for copyright
infringement where it hosts a subscriber’s web site containing infringing
material, provided that once the ISP receives a notice from a copyright
owner reporting an alleged infringement, it expeditiously removes the
infringing material.
Under the DMCA, ISPs have through their responses to such
notices effectively served as first-instance adjudicators of disputes
between copyright owners and users who post copyrighted content to
websites. The practices of ISPs clearly have the capacity to support
norms with respect to both the scope and enforcement of copyright.
Indeed, ISP practices under the DMCA are coming to establish
international norms. U.S. copyright owners are serving notices on ISPs
worldwide and receiving surprisingly high levels of compliance.
Typically, extrusion of a country’s law occurs through its application by
courts, nominally restrained by private international law, a context that
is both transparent and subject to contest by courts of other countries.
These checks are lacking in the DMCA context.
Moreover, ISP practices may shift the balance between the
application of national and international rules. Every aspect of the
international regime implicitly allocates prescriptive authority. Where
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this balance is adjusted via ISP practices, however, the allocation might
be the product of serendipitous forces largely related to the governance
and client bases of multi-national ISPs rather than any publicly debated
policy value.
3) Copyright owners increasingly use technological measures to
protect their works against unauthorized acts, and international law
imposes no limits on the type of measure owners can use. Like ISP
practices, technology need not be territorially configured. Copyright
owners may deploy protection measures that are tied to international
rather than national norms. Alternatively, technological measures have
the capability to reterritorialize international knowledge markets and
implement national norms, and they can set norms without reference to
either national or international norms. Private ordering thus can affect
the structural norms of international copyright law: According to which
set of values will the decision whether to universalize or territorialize be
made? Again, we do not know, because this private ordering is subject
to little or no scrutiny at any level, and certainly none at the
international level.
Let me turn now to some of the ways existing institutions have
revised their lawmaking operations. WIPO continues to be a primary
institutional component of the new system, but it has reinvented itself.
In addition to its traditional functions, WIPO has built relationships
with many new actors. For example, it has signed a cooperation
agreement with the WTO, facilitating the incorporation of WIPOcreated norms into the WTO process. Indeed, the WTO panel report in
United States—Section 110(5) encouraged continuing integration by
favoring the interpretation of TRIPs consistent with norms in the
broader network of copyright treaties. This principle gives WIPO an
ever-open entry point into the WTO system.
Similarly, the UDRP adopted by ICANN was drafted by WIPO, and
WIPO’s Arbitration Center is the primary administrator of the
proceedings through which claims under it are resolved. Moreover,
WIPO continues to be a leading forum for development of the UDRP,
shaping the direction of those international standards in ways that
ICANN’s own internal review committee has been unable to achieve.
Finally, WIPO has recognized the changed nature of current
demands for internationalization (made primarily by right holders):
(1) International solutions are now being sought more quickly.
Some recent international instruments have articulated rather than
codified norms, perhaps reflecting a fear that national practices may
give rise to norms that would be hard to compromise internationally at a
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later date.
(2)
The call for early international intervention has been
accompanied by difficulty in achieving consensus among the more
numerous and diverse members of the new system, especially without
the possibility of non-intellectual property side payments that facilitated
TRIPs.
Thus WIPO restructured itself institutionally to generate more soft
law, such as non-binding recommendations adopted by its Standing
Committee on Trademarks. These recommendations are accepted
more speedily and provoke less entrenchment on the part of national
delegations.
This soft law is hardened in many ways, but few of these involve the
WTO. For example, the hardening of the UDRP arguably stems from
its functional advantages to trademark owners.
And standing
committee resolutions have found their way into TRIPs-plus bilateral
agreements, opinions of national jurists, and proposals for formal WIPO
treaties, such as the proposed Revised Trademark Law Treaty.
Soft law is thus an important component of the new system,
although its significance (and hardening) often depends upon
interactions with parts of the system other than the WTO.
Trade arrangements remain important, however. As multilateral
ministerial discussions have stalled, leading developed countries have
pursued bilaterally harmonization agendas that cannot be achieved
multilaterally. These bilateral agreements typically impose TRIPs-plus
standards. They have therefore attracted the ire of critics who take
issue with the substantive intellectual property balance that they
embody, especially when imposed upon developing countries, whose
immediate need for lesser protection is reflected in the continuing grace
periods that permit delays in full implementation of the bare TRIPs
standards.
Gains secured in a series of bilateral arrangements have commonly
been consolidated through the multilateral device, and the United
States has acknowledged this dynamic in explaining its bilateral strategy.
Yet the introduction of most-favored nation obligations into
international intellectual property law by the TRIPs Agreement may
increase the momentum to move to the multilateral level.
Problematically, too, a lack of transparency often attends bilateral
negotiations.
Although bilateral agreements are not new, it is when they work in
tandem with other institutional devices that the role of the bilateral in
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the new system becomes significant. Thus, bilaterals have become a
means by which the United States seeks to harden the nonbinding
resolutions of the WIPO Standing Committee on Trademarks regarding
the protection of well-known marks. It is through bilateral negotiations
that the United States is persuading countries to use the UDRP as a
model for resolution of cybersquatting disputes in their country-code
domain. Finally, bilaterals might break down the coalition of twenty
developing countries that has blocked the U.S. multilateral agenda.
Indeed, a review of bilateral activity highlights a broader point:
Even in the trade context, the shape of international intellectual
property law is being determined by the interaction of numerous
components of the system.
In addition to bilateralism, we must be alert to unilateralism. There
should be no trade unilateralism after TRIPs, but here I want to use the
term as an introduction to the increasingly important activities of
national courts. Ten years ago, one could barely detect a private
international law of intellectual property, either in the courts or in the
literature.
In the classical system, national courts had very little role to play in
the construction of international intellectual property law. Litigation
involved national rights; courts were reluctant even to adjudicate claims
involving foreign intellectual property rights, prompting serial national
litigation of multinational disputes.
National courts are, however, beginning to tackle multinational
cases and thus to contribute to the effective creation of international
norms. This has occurred most perceptibly in the copyright context in
the United States, where courts will now hear claims under foreign laws,
provide multinational relief, and effectively regulate globally by
localizing any Internet conduct in the United States.
These trends are less evident in patent cases, but U.S. courts have
become less restrained in applying the Lanham Act extraterrorially.
The enactment of the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act in
1999 has prompted even more intrusive U.S. judicial regulation of
domain name space. Thus, private law developments in national courts
increasingly generate the content of international intellectual property
law.
How do we bring coherence to this dispersed, decentralized system?
One might view this array of new actors, sources and institutions as
intervening data points, all designed to feed back to a central institution,
whether the WTO or WIPO.
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I resist this impulse. Such a dispersed system may possess
advantages over the classical model. For example, national court
development of “international law,” like technological measures and
ISP practices, can (if properly transparent and monitored) be more
responsive to social conditions and hence more dynamic than the treaty
process. Moreover, such lawmaking would not result in the premature
entrenchment of a higher norm of international law in the way that
WTO dispute settlement body rulings in practice might do. It is more
readily subject to control by national political institutions. Moreover,
this means of developing international intellectual property law is less
subject to the political demands that historically have burdened the
treaty process and that continue to limit its efficacy. Finally, such a
mélange of national and international norms conforms to the
decentralized yet interconnected structure of global society.
I also resist the effort to feed these developments back toward the
multilateral treaty system, because it is inevitable that the non-treatybased system will effect internationalization more efficiently than the
further development of TRIPs.
The interests at stake are now so varied, the reach of intellectual
property law so wide, the demands of internationalization so strong, that
it is hard to envisage an ambitious treaty on substantive norms that can
obtain broad approval. In light of those same factors, plus burgeoning
technological capacity and a proliferation of transnational actors
(whether corporations, users, or NGOs), it is hard to see how a nontreaty system can be stopped.
The WTO will not, of course, recede into the darkness. So what is
its role? Rochelle Dreyfuss and I have argued that dispute settlement
panels must follow interpretive principles of neofederalism that
preserve the autonomy of member states to adopt approaches tailored
to their own circumstances. The formalism that TRIPs panels have
exhibited thus far might, we fear, be used to limit autonomy and expand
international obligations at a time when an impasse has been reached
among negotiators of TRIPs II.
In the Ministerial context, Ruth Okediji has focused on the factors
that affect coalition-building by developing countries to redress
imbalances among states occasioned by power asymmetries and weak
domestic institutions. Larry Helfer has explained how developing
countries have engaged in regime-shifting to generate alternative
substantive norms. Jerry Reichman and Keith Maskus propose a
moratorium. The time has come, they say, “to take intellectual property
off the international lawmaking agenda.” Each of these proposals
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reflects a concern that the process toward universal standards is moving
more quickly, and more definitively, than is advisable.
I am reluctant “to take intellectual property off the international
lawmaking agenda.” To be sure, under the classical model, multilateral
agreements were built upon an evolving consensus. But the tide is
running more strongly toward global solutions; for reasons of principle
and pragmatism, we must react differently.
As a matter of principle, although internationalization may be
occurring more quickly, and sometimes without the transparency or
participation that is ideal, the exigencies of global trade and digital
technologies require recalibration of the balance between national and
international norms. To debate what that balance should be, we need
information and institutional structures that allow choices to be made
fairly and consciously. That is why the process of international
intellectual property lawmaking should be a primary focus of attention.
Pragmatically, one cannot take intellectual property off the
international lawmaking table because so much internationalization is
taking place underneath the table. Reichman and Maskus hope that a
moratorium would preserve the status quo and the autonomy with
which nation-states are invested. Instead, it may simply defer to the
different lawmaking institutions and actors already discussed.
International lawmaking is necessary to ensure that these new processes
occur transparently and in ways likely to produce the optimal balance
that Reichman and Maskus seek to preserve. In short, there must still
be a positive international intellectual property agenda.
What should that agenda be?
First, scholars and policymakers must recognize the inevitable and
potentially useful ability of private actors, nonstate actors, technology,
multinational corporations, and national courts to effect the
internationalization of intellectual property norms.
Second, to ensure that these norms are developed with the same
respect for voice and legitimacy that guided the development of the
classical treaty-based system, attention must be paid to question of
process, transparency, and representation. Transparency of private
practices is essential if active national lawmaking is to act as a constraint
on private ordering. What I have called “the public structuring” of
private ordering becomes key. Rules must address the structural
incentives for developing norms in one direction or another. And there
must be a public allocation of certain issues to the national or the
international realm. These questions are beginning to be addressed in
scattered national, regional, and international instruments, but they
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must be given greater significance.
Third, in this decentralized system, the interaction between
components may represent an important source of law. That interaction
will help construct the balance between the national and the universal.
For example, should national courts defer to UDRP panel opinions, or
to other national courts addressing multinational disputes? Should they
pay heed to the public international backdrop (whether in treaties or
soft law) in interpreting the content and scope of national law?
In the context of national judicial relations, ongoing discussions may
shape the answer to these questions. The Hague Conference on Private
International Law continues to work on a jurisdiction and judgments
convention that, although narrower than the treaty contemplated four
years ago, would greatly enhance the role of national courts in the
intellectual property system. Likewise, the American Law Institute
(ALI) last year commenced a project to formulate soft law principles to
guide courts in resolving international intellectual property disputes.
These specific examples highlight two conceptual points of focus for
the international intellectual property system.
First, in an era in which substantive issues are often too contested to
conclude treaties, but in which technology and global trade will force
and facilitate international solutions, the focus of the international
intellectual property law system has to be in large part on institutional
design. The Hague and ALI projects would establish the basic
conditions under which national courts could contribute to and develop
a form of international intellectual property law. The international
system has to create an environment in which that lawmaking is fair and
balanced. That is, the process and structure of lawmaking must be
addressed. This is true of the ways in which national courts contribute,
but it is true also of how private actors contribute, how soft law
contributes, how governmental and NGO networks contribute, and how
intergovernmental organizations contribute.
Second, increasingly international intellectual property has to focus
on constraints or checks on lawmaking. As Ruth Okediji has stressed,
this is the classical role of international law, but I would emphasize that
the constraints in question must address checks on more than simply
national legislative activity.
Thus, the Hague Convention would empower national courts to do
what they might in any event do unilaterally, but it would also constrain
them, requiring them to articulate the reasons for their involvement in
the international intellectual property system.
Consolidation
obligations (or even opportunities) in such a treaty might also operate
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as a constraint on multinational corporations exploiting the legal fiction
of territoriality to secure strategic gains in multinational litigation.
In the context of private actors, international obligations of
transparency and public structuring of the environment in which private
ordering occurs might act as a constraint on the effective lawmaking of
private actors.
National courts, themselves subject to constraints imposed by way of
a jurisdiction convention, might be important checks on ICANN/UDRP
panels pushing the mandate of anti-cybersquatting authority too
aggressively in the face of legitimate national interests. (In fact, this
dual role of national courts merely illustrates that the system will
ultimately rely on different components checking each other).
Finally, international treaties might contain what I have called
“substantive maxima” (what others have called “users’ rights,” and what
might also be called “mandatory limits and exceptions”) that would
constrain national legislatures. Ideally, they would do so in ways akin to
the role played by substantive minima in a century in which lack of any
protection was a pre-dominant concern.
Thus designed, and thus constrained, this array of lawmaking
institutions presents opportunities for reconfiguring the international
intellectual property system in ways that strike the balance the system
has always sought to promote, but in ways that reflect the more global
nature of modern life.

